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Abstract 
Speed’s theory makes two predictions for the development of analogical reasoning. Firstly, 
young children should not be able to reason analogically due to an undeveloped PFC neural 
network. Secondly, category knowledge enables the reinforcement of structural features over 
surface features, and thus the development of sophisticated, analogical, reasoning. We outline 
existing studies that support these predictions and highlight some critical remaining issues. 
Specifically, we argue that the development of inhibition must be directly compared 
alongside the development of reasoning strategies in order to support Speed’s account. 
 
Introduction 
Speed suggests that during development, neurons become organized along the posterior-
anterior axis of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) such that anterior regions are tuned to 
increasingly abstract and complex situations. Speed’s theory proposes that these changes 
occur through “reinforcement-driven discrimination” (pg26), such that the response 
preferences of neurons in PFC are tuned through reinforcement of particular relationships. 
We can therefore derive two key predictions for the development of analogical reasoning: 
1. Young children should not be able to reason analogically due to an undeveloped PFC 
neural network (although Speed does not detail the timecourse of this development).  
2. Analogical reasoning must be learned. Specifically, knowledge of the category of 
interest enables the reinforcement of “structural” features over “surface” features, and 
thus more sophisticated reasoning. 
Support for Prediction 1 
There is evidence that young children focus on perceptual over category information when 
making generalizations about the properties / behavior of new items. Sloutsky, Kloos and 
Fisher (2007) found that four to five year old children could successfully learn to group novel 
animals into categories, even when category information was pitted against obvious surface 
cues (shape / colour). However, in a subsequent induction task, children reverted back to 
grouping objects in terms of obvious surface information, rather than basing induction 
decisions on category information. We have replicated this finding using biologically 
plausible novel animals (Badger & Shapiro, 2010), and additionally show that children shift 
from perceptual induction to category induction around age seven. These data suggest that 
young children’s natural default is to focus on surface features, and the ability to use 
structural features develops gradually during early childhood. According to Speed, this ability 
is constrained by the development of the PFC network. 
Support for Prediction 2 
There is evidence that children can be trained to focus on non-obvious, or unobservable 
biological features within a particular domain. For example, Au, Chan, Chan, Cheung, Ho 
and Ip (2008) found that training that focused on the biological causal mechanism for cold 
and flu transmission was considerably more effective in impacting on children’s reasoning 
about infectious diseases and preventative behavior than rule-based training programs. These 
data fit with Speed’s hypothesis that category knowledge reinforces PFC response 
preferences that correspond to structural over surface features of the domain. 
Outstanding Issues 
There is an alternative interpretation of these data. Specifically, Gelman (e.g., 2003; see also 
Bulloch & Opfer, 2009) argues that even young children are biased towards essentialist 
(internal, intrinsic) causes, and thus should show a natural default towards category 
induction. Thus, any bias towards surface / perceptual features in early reasoning must be 
interpreted as an inability to inhibit the “obvious” perceptual response over the less salient 
category-based default. Similarly, Au et al.’s findings must be interpreted as improving 
children’s ability to inhibit obvious /observable explanations, enabling their natural bias 
towards “essentialist” causes to be expressed. 
Our research (Badger & Shapiro, 2010) directly tests perceptual-bias vs. inhibition 
interpretations of early perceptual induction. As in Sloutsky et al., we trained children to 
categorize novel insects according to a non-obvious category-membership rule (head shape). 
The salient perceptual cues (e.g. overall size, shape, colour) were not predictive of category 
membership. Children then performed a triad induction task in which they were asked to 
generalize a hidden property of the target to one of two test items (same-category choice or 
perceptual distractor). Unlike previous studies, we compared induction choices when the 
distractor items were at different levels of similarity to the target. As expected, children made 
significantly more perceptual (distractor) choices when this item was highly similar to the 
target. However, this effect did not interact with age. Thus, increased inhibition abilities 
cannot be driving children’s shift from perceptual to category induction. Instead, this shift is 
likely to be triggered by the development of more sophisticated reasoning abilities. These 
findings support Speed’s PFC account of analogical reasoning, over competing accounts 
based on cognitive control, and highlight the need for developmental evidence to back up 
claims about the neural mechanisms of analogical processing. 
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